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THE HEARING EXAMINER LOAN PROGRAM
ANTONIN SCALIA*
The Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure,
whose report was the foundation of the Administrative Procedure
Act,' characterized the selection and retention of qualified hearing
examiners as "the heart of formal administrative adjudication." 2
Another commentator has observed that the hearing examiner
provisions of the APA "probably constitute the most important
modifications in the adjudication process brought about by the Act."3
The present article deals with past experience and future prospects
under one of these provisions which has received less attention than its
inherent interest and long-range implications might warrant.
In its entirety, the "hearing examiner" section of the APA reads
as follows:
Sec. 11. Subject to the civil-service and other laws to the extent not
inconsistent with this Act, there shall be appointed by and for each agency as
many qualified and competent examiners as may be necessary for proceedings
pursuant to sections 7 and 8, who shall be assigned to cases in rotation so far as
practicable and shall perform no duties inconsistent with their duties and
responsibilities as examiners. Examiners shall be removable by the agency in
which they are employed only for good cause established and determined by the
Civil Service Commission . . . after opportunity for hearing and upon the
record thereof. Examiners shall receive compensation prescribed by the
Commission independently of agency recommendations or ratings and in
accordance with the Classification Act of 1923. . . . Agencies occasionally or
temporarily insufficiently staffed may utilize examiners selected by the
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Commission from and with the consent of other agencies. For the purposes of
this section, the Commission is authorized to make investigations, require
reports by agencies, issue reports, including an annual report to the Congress,
promulgate rules, appoint such advisory committees as may be deemed
necessary, recommend legislation, subpoena witnesses or records, and pay
witness fees as established for the United States courts.4
The specific concern of this study is the implementation of that
sentence of the original section 11 italicized above. As recodified in
section 3344 of Title 5 of the United States Code,5 the sentence now
reads as follows:
An agency as defined by section 551 of this title which occasionally or
temporarily is insufficiently staffed with hearing examiners appointed under
section 3105 of this title may use hearing examiners selected by the Civil
Service Commission from and with the consent of other agencies.
Responsibility for implementing the various provisions of section
11 of the APA, including the loan provision, was until 1954
distributed among various departments of the Civil Service
Commission (referred to in this article as the Commission), with the
Executive Director providing coordination and direction. In partial
compliance with a recommendation made by the 1953 President's
Conference on Administrative Procedure, 7 the Commission in 1954
established a separate job classification to coordinate the hearing
examiner program, with the title of "Administrative Officer."
Finally, in 1962, it created the current Office of Hearing Examiners
under the supervision of its own Director, who reports through the
Executive Director directly to the Commission. This Office is charged
not merely with the coordination but with the direction of the entire
hearing examiner program. Its Director has been assigned "total
responsibility for planning, operating, and directing a nationwide
program for the employment and compensation of Hearing
Examiners," and "complete authority to act in all areas except those
matters specifically reserved to the full Commission." '
4. Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, § 11, 60 Stat. 244 (emphasis added).
5. 5 U.S.C. § 3344 (Supp. V, 1970). The 1966 recodification of Title 5, Act of Sept. 6, 1966,
Pub. L. No. 89-544, 80 Stat. 378, separated the various provisions of section I I of the APA and
scattered them in various sections, with some necessary alterations in wording although not in
substance.
6. 5 U.S.C. § 3344 (Supp. V, 1970).
7. The Conference had recommended that a Bureau of Hearing Examiner Administration
be established within the Commission. REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE 9 (1953).
8. Civil Service Commission Position Description -Director, Office of Hearing Examiners,
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In operation, the loan provision of section II has developed from
an occasional convenience into a regular feature of the hearing
examiner system. In the six and one-half years from June 11, 1947, the
date the examiner-selection provisions of section II became effective,
to January 1954, the Commission authorized a total of only 9 loans.
In Fiscal Year 1955 alone it authorized 10; in Fiscal 1959, 20; and in
Fiscal 1967, 48. In Fiscal 1969, the annual rate increased to 96, a peak
which was almost matched in Fiscal 1970 when 86 loans were made.9
The extent of the loan business is apparent from the following list of
agencies to which section I 1 loans have been made: 0
Atomic Energy Commission Federal Highway Administration,
* Board of Parole, Department of Justice Department of Transportation
* Bureau of Commercial Fisheries * Federal Home Loan Bank Board
Bureau of the Mint Federal Power Commission
Bureau of Narcotics & Dangerous Drugs, * Federal Reserve Board
Department of Justice Food and Drug Administration, HEW
Civil Service Commission Internal Security Division,
Comptroller of the Currency Department of Justice
Department of Commerce Japanese Claims Section,
Department of Housing & Urban Department of Justice
Development *National Labor Relations Board
* Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation National Transportation Safety
Board, Department of Trans-
portation
at 1 (1962). The full text of this Position Description is contained in Attachment 2 to the REPORT
OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR HEARING EXAMINERS TO UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSIONERS (1963). The Report contains a description of the history of administration of
the Hearing Examiner Program. See id. at 15.
There has in fact been much more continuity to the administration of the hearing examiner
program than the organizational history described in the text might suggest. From the date of
passage of the APA until April, 1971, with the exception of a brief period during 1961, initial
responsibility for coordination and direction of all of the Commission's functions pertaining to
hearing examiners rested with a single individual, Wilson M. Matthews. He was appointed
Administrative Officer in charge of the program when that position was established in 1954 and
was the Director of the Office of Hearing Examiners from its creation in 1962 until his
retirement in April, 1971.
9. These figures on annual loans are the Commission's own computations, made at various
times and for various internal purposes. It is likely that the basis of computation was not
consistent in one respect. The 1969 and 1970 figures include as separate loans those extensions
which pertain to loans made during the preceding fiscal year; the figures for the early years-at
least until 1954-do not appear to do so; and the basis of computation for the intervening years
is impossible to determine. Moreover, even if extensions were counted for purposes of the earlier
computations, some distortion would still exist by reason of the fact that the permissible
duration of the original loan has varied through the years, thereby creating an irrational
variation in the number of extensions. Since, however, the extensions constitute a relatively
small proportion of the total figure, even in the most recent years, and since many extensions are
for the purpose of hearing entirely new cases, the figures given in the text should provide at least
a rough representation of the constant and accelerating growth of loan business.
10. An asterisk indicates that the borrowings have been frequent.
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Office of Director of Practice, Patent Office
Bureau of Internal Revenue, Post Office Department
Treasury Department Securities and Exchange Commission
Office of Economic Opportunity Small Business Administration
*Office of Education, HEW Social and Rehabilitation
Office of the Secretary, Service, HEW
Department of Interior Subversive Activities Control
*Office of the Secretary, HEW Board
Office of Special Assistant Veterans' Education Appeals
to the President Board
Oil Import Administration,
Department of Interior
The agencies which have loaned examiners include the following:
Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division, *Federal Trade Commission
Bureau of Internal Revenue, Interstate Commerce Commission
Treasury Department Maritime Administration,
Atomic Energy Commission Department of Commerce
Bureau of Commercial Fisheries National Labor Relations Board
Bureau of Land Management Office of Alien Property,
Civil Aeronautics Board Department of Justice
*Civil Service Commission Post Office Department
Department of Agriculture Securities and Exchange Commission
Federal Communications Commission *Small Business Administration
Federal Maritime Commission *Social Security Administration, HEW
Federal Power Commission Subversive Activities Control
Federal Railroad Administration Board
One may properly conclude from the foregoing statistics that the
hearing examiner loan program has grown to become an accepted and
important feature of the administrative system. It is a feature,
however, whose operation and effects have received no systematic
study, neither in reports to the Commission itself nor in the mass of
law review articles and other published material dealing with hearing
examiners in general. References to the loan program do, indeed,
abound; they are generally made, however, not for the purpose of
increasing the available knowledge concerning the characteristics and
effects of the program, but for the purpose of basing further
conclusions upon what are presumed to be those characteristics and
effects. Thus, despite the absence of any systematic evaluation of the
performance of borrowed examiners, the loan program has been cited
1I. An asterisk indicates that the loans have been frequent.
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as proof that selective certification is not necessary, 2 and indeed that
all hearing examiners may successfully operate from a common
"pool," neither employed by, nor specializing in the work of, any
particular agency. ,3 Such conclusions may or may not be correct; but
certainly the loan program can shed no light upon them until more is
known about the effectiveness of the loan program itself.
The present study, then, will seek to satisfy the need for more
concrete information concerning a program which has considerable
importance both in its own right and as an experimental divergence
from the usual procedures for providing examiners to handle agency
business.
THE SCOPE OF THE LOAN PROVISION OF THE APA
This article is concerned only with those loans or "details" of
hearing examiners which fall under the supervision of the Civil Service
Commission by virtue of section 11 of the APA. The question initially
arises whether this category includes all loans of hearing examiner
personnel. The Commission has taken the position that it does not,
but rather is limited to those loans made for the purpose of
conducting hearings as required under sections 4 and 5 of the APA. 14
More specifically, the Commission has maintained that the detail of
an examiner to another agency for a purpose other than the
conducting of an APA hearing may be made by the employing agency
itself, without even the need for Commission approval.
This interpretation of the loan provision of the APA is not
inevitable, but it seems correct. Two positions may be taken in
opposition to it. First, one may argue that the loan provision, with its
requirement of Commission selection, applies to all loans of hearing
examiners, not just those for the purpose of holding APA hearings.
Such an interpretation, however, seems to run counter to that portion
of the original loan provision'5 which limits its applicability to
"agencies occasionally or temporarily insufficiently staffed." This
seems reasonably to refer to insufficient staffing with respect to that
12. See notes 72-74 infra.
13. See text accompanying notes 102, 107-09 infra.
14. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553-54 (Supp. V, 1970). Section 7 of the APA requires that such hearings
be presided over by hearing examiners appointed under section 11, unless the agency or one or
more members of the body which comprises the agency preside. 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (Supp. V,
1970).
15. See the italicized portion of section 11 appearing in text at note 4 supra.
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work which only hearing examiners can perform, so that the
"'utilization" referred to later in the sentence must similarly be
interpreted to apply only to utilization for APA hearing purposes.
This point was strengthened by the re-wording of the loan provision in
connection with the 1966 recodification; section I I now refers not
merely to agencies "insufficiently staffed" but to agencies
"insufficiently staffed with hearing examiners appointed under
section 3105." 6 The brief discussion of the loan provision found in
the legislative history of the APA appears to assume that it applies
only to loans for APA hearing purposes.1 7 Such an assumption is even
more evident in the Final Report of the Attorney General's
Committee on Administrative Procedure, whose Recommendation
1(d) with respect to Formal Adjudication was the original source of
the loan provision of the APA. 5
The second position in opposition to the Commission's view
acknowledges that section 11 only has explicit reference to details for
the purpose of holding APA hearings. It concludes from this,
however, not that other loans do not require Commission supervision
but that other loans are not permitted. That is, according to this view
the provision of specific procedures for only one type of loan is an
indication that only that type is allowable. Representing an
application of the ancient canon of construction "inclusio unius,
exclusio alterius," such an interpretation is textually tenable. But it
makes little practical sense in view of other rules governing the use of
examiners. As will be discussed below, there is little doubt that a
hearing examiner may be used for non-APA purposes within his own
agency, where the risk of compromising his impartiality or lessening
his stature is much greater than it is on loan. Thus, to interpret section
II as proscribing loans for non-APA purposes is to attribute to the
legislature the intent to strain out the gnat after having swallowed the
camel.
Of course there are some restrictions upon the purposes for which
these non-APA details can be made. All loans must comply with that
provision of section 11 which forbids assignment of hearing
examiners, even within their own agency, to duties "inconsistent with
16. 5 U.S.C. § 3344 (Supp. V, 1970) (emphasis added).
17. See H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 46-47 (1946), reprinted in Administrative
Procedure Act, Legislative History, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 281 (1946)
[hereinafter cited as A PA: Legislative History].
18. See ATT'Y GEN. REP. 49.
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their duties and responsibilities as hearing examiners."' 9 The precise
meaning of "inconsistent" has not yet been definitively established
and seems likely to be a source of controversy in the future. It clearly
forbids assignment of an examiner to prosecutory duties within his
agency; but in the past, hearing examiners at both the Federal
Communications Commission and the Civil Service Commission
have asserted that it prevents the imposition of any non-hearing
duties, including participation on boards of review. This assertion was
rejected by the Commission 2 -rightly, it seems, in view of the
legislative history of section 11. As originally introduced in both the
House and the Senate, it provided that hearing examiners "shall
perform no other duties" than the hearing and deciding of cases.2 1 If
the language of the bill as finally enacted-"no duties inconsistent
with their duties and responsibilities as hearing examiners"-is
construed to permit the assignment of no additional duties beyond the
hearing and deciding of non-APA cases, the deliberate change in
wording will have been deprived of any effect. This is not to say that
only participation in prosecutory matters would be "inconsistent"
within the meaning of the Act; certainly there are other assignments
which come within the prohibition, not because they compromise the
examiner's impartiality but because they demean his status. It was
partly on this ground that the Committee on Hearing Examiners of
the American Bar Association Section on Administrative Law
successfully opposed the assignment of hearing examiners at the
United States Coast Guard to serve as assistant legal assistance
officers. 22 But this interpretation still leaves a wide range of
19. 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (Supp. V, 1970).
20. Interview with Wilson M. Matthews, Director, Office of Hearing Examiners, U.S. Civil
Service Commission, Washington, D.C., Aug. 1I, 1970.
In recent months, examiners of another agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission, have
taken a position almost polar to that which their confreres earlier adopted. They claim the right
to represent agency employees in administrative appeals before the ICC. Not only do they se
nothing in section II which prohibits this, but they assert that attempted prohibition would
violate the Commission's regulations which permit an employee presenting an appeal "to be
accompanied, represented and advised by a representative of his own choosing," 5 C.F.R.
§ 771.201(a)(2) (1970), and assure that representative, if he is another agency employee, "a
reasonable amount of official time" to present the appeal. Id. §§ 771.201(b)(2), 771.206. The
Office of Hearing Examiners has maintained that acting in an adverse capacity against the
agency is "inconsistent" with the duties and responsibilities of the hearing examiners under
section II.
21. This provision was contained in section 7(a) of the bill introduced by Senator
McCarran, S. 7, 79th Cong., Ist Sess. (1946). See APA: Legislative History 11, 158.
22. Interview with John T. Miller, Jr., former Chairman, Committee on Hearing
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permissible assignment within the examiner's own agency-and
permissible loan-beyond the hearing and deciding of cases.
One more limitation upon non-APA loans-and again one which
is applicable also to intra-agency assignment-is contained in the
Civil Service Commission's regulations. Absent a Commission
finding that waiver of the restriction is in the public interest, no
examiner may be assigned without Commission approval to perform
"duties that are not duties of a hearing examiner" (that is, non-APA
work) unless the assignment is to last no longer than 120 days and the
hearing examiner has not had an aggregate of more than 120 days of
such assignments within the preceding 12 months13
As limited by the above-described restrictions, non-APA
examiner loans arranged between the agencies themselves are not
uncommon. The most frequent are for the purpose of holding hearings
concerning personnel grievance matters such as suspensions and
removals. At least some, however, have been for non-hearing
purposes: for example, the numerous borrowings which the Civil
Service Commission itself has made in order to meet its
responsibilities for the provision of federal examiners under section 6
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.24
One extraordinary series of loans represents a departure from the
Commission's policy of refusing to arrange loans for non-APA
purposes-though not a departure from its position that Commission
arrangement in .such cases is not required. Under the Labor-
Management Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board is
empowered to issue orders requiring persons to cease and desist from
unfair labor practices defined in the Act.25 The resulting orders,
however, are not self-executing, but require enforcement through
judicial decrees and, in the event of further infraction, through civil
contempt proceedings for violation of the judicial decrees .2 Although
these contempt proceedings must ordinarily be brought in United
States courts of appeals, they frequently involve factual disputes
which require the taking of evidence-a function which appellate
Examiners, ABA Section on Administrative Law, Washington, D.C., Aug. 12, 1970. See 4
ABA AD. LAW SEcrioN, ANNUAL REP. OF COMMS. 10 (1967) (Hearing Examiners Comm.
1966-67).
23. See5 C.F.R. § 930.209 (1970).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1973d (Supp. V, 1970).
25. Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c)
(1964).
26. Id. § 10(e), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1964).
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courts are neither equipped nor inclined to perform. Hence, the matter
is normally referred to a court-appointed Special Master who
conducts a hearing and makes findings of fact and conclusions of
law." These Special Masters are usually active United States district
judges or retired United States district or court of appeals judges, but
the press of other business frequently renders such individuals
unavailable. The appointment of a private attorney, which is
permissible, has several disadvantages: A practitioner's impartiality
in labor matters is less apparent; he is likely to be inexperienced in the
conduct of hearings; the more successful a lawyer he is, the less time
he can find to devote to the case; and the court must find funds to
compensate him adequately-which ordinarily means that a fairly
substantial bill will be assessed against one or both of the parties. 2
Two courts of appeals, the First and the Fifth Circuits, saw a solution
to the difficulty in the use of federal hearing examiners. There were,
however, several obstacles to be overcome. Use of the NLRB's own
examiners would have appeared improper, since the agency itself is
ordinarily the complaining party; moreover, the NLRB examiner
staff is not notably short of work. The direct borrowing of an
examiner by the NLRB for re-loan to the court would have avoided
these problems, but would have given the Board an unseemly amount
of discretion in the selection of the person to adjudge its own case. The
ideal solution which was devised might be termed the "simulated
section II loan." Mimicking its section 11 procedures, which are not
27. Although the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure make no provision for the
appointment of masters, the power is inherent. See Kaufman, Masters in the Federal Courts:
Rule 53, 58 COLUi. L. REv. 452, 462 (1958). Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
contains detailed provisions concerning masters. Although this rule is of course applicable only
to United States district courts, it is often used by analogy to govern the use of masters in courts
of appeals. See 2B W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1161,
at 577 (C. Wright ed. 1961); 5 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 53.02[2],53.0217] (1969). See,
e.g., NLRB v. Teamsters Local 282, 428 F.2d 994, 1006 (2d Cir. 1970).
28. Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(a). The importance of this last-mentioned factor ofcompensation
is exemplified by the following excerpt from a letter addressed to the Office of Hearing
Examiners by the Chief Judge of one United States court of appeals, seeking the appointment of
an examiner as Special Master in an NLRB contempt proceeding:
[A]t this time of year our district court is very busy and I hesitate to appoint a district
judge as master, and I doubt whether the respondent is in a position to compensate a
private attorney in that position. Accordingly, I would like to call upon you, if that is
appropriate, and to ask you to submit a name for the court to designate.
Letter from Chief Judge Bailey Aldrich, United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, to
Office of Hearing Examiners, U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n (undated letter on file at U.S. Civil
Serv. Comm'n, Washington, D.C.).
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genuinely applicable since the contemplated hearing is not "required
by the APA," the Commission arranges a loan to the NLRB for the
purpose of re-loan to the courts. Acting not under the APA, but
presumably under its more general authority and responsibility to
meet the personnel needs of federal agencies, the Commission plays
the role of the indispensable broker, enabling the NLRB to obtain
and to provide an examiner untainted by NLRB selection.
The Office of Hearing Examiners does not rigidly segregate these
NLRB loans from its section 11 loan business; to the contrary, it
apparently attempts to make them resemble section 11 loans as much
as possible. Their uniqueness is apparent, however, from several
procedures preliminary to those which accompany the normal loan.
The initial notice received by the Commission is not the loan request
from the agency itself, but an inquiry from the clerk of court. In reply
the Commission supplies the names and brief biographies of two or
three examiners who are available. 29 When the court has informed the
Commission of its selection from among this group, the subsequent
procedures are arranged to look like an ordinary section 11 loan: The
NLRB makes written request for appointment of an examiner "under
the provisions of Civil Service Regulation 930.213" (the regulation
implementing the loan provision of section 11), and the Commission
obligingly appoints the very examiner selected by the court.
Extensions are arranged directly between the NLRB and the
Commission, with no further intervention by the court.
From all indications, the simulated section 11 loan has been a
most successful device for all parties concerned. The NLRB and the
private litigants have had the benefit of expedition in the-arrangement
of the hearing, and of economy,30 undoubted impartiality, and
unusual skill3' in the conduct of the proceedings and the determination
29. This is in sharp contrast to the normal section II procedures, under which a single
examiner is selected and appointed by the Commission. See p. 335 of text infra.
30. The examiner's services are not necessarily provided by the NLR B free of charge to the
private litigant. The apportioning of the cost of the examiner lies, of course, within the discretion
of the court, cf FED. R. Civ. P. 53(a), and it is usually divided between the parties. Such division
is achieved in the cases under discussion by requiring the private party to reimburse the NLRB
for one-half of the Special Master's compensation and expenses. See, e.g., NLRB v. Alamo
Express, 395 F.2d 481,484 (5th Cir. 1968). Since, however, this compensation consists merely of
a ratable portion of the examiner's annual salary, and takes no account of overhead costs, it is
significantly less than would be required to retain a private attorney of the required ability. One
suspects, however, that the major attraction of examiners is not the economy of their skilled
services, but their impartiality and ready availability for lengthy periods of time.
31. For a case adopting the recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law of a
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of the disputed matters. The borrowing courts have had the benefit of
experienced professional services of which they were in dire need and
which were in temporary oversupply elsewhere within the same federal
government. And the examiners themselves have had the benefit of
assignments which not only added variety to their regular routine but
increased their own sense of pride and professionalism. The procedure
does, of course, present some danger of burdening the Commission
and the examiner corps with too much of a good thing. But so far only
the First and Fifth Circuits have sought to make use of the simulated
section 11 loan, and at least for the time being the Commission seems
able to meet their needs. If and when the number of requests becomes
excessive, the loans can simply be refused. No agency need loan an
examiner, even under section 11; and in a non-section 11 situation, the
Commission itself has no obligation even to try to arrange a loan. It
seems best, therefore, to leave this problem of possible over-demand
to the discretion of the Office of Hearing Examiners, to make or
refuse NLRB loans as conditions dictate; for although the Office's
records and procedures conceal the nonstatutory character of this
business, there does exist an awareness that it is, in a sense,
superogatory and subsidiary to the main task of the loan program.
One other possible limitation upon the scope of the section 11 loan
program must be mentioned briefly, if only to reject it. On one
occasion, a member of the legal staff of a borrowing agency suggested
to the Office of Hearing Examiners that the loan provision of the
APA may not be used by agencies with no hearing examiners of their
own. His position was based upon an exceedingly narrow
interpretation of the phrase which section 11 uses to describe those
agencies which may borrow examiners-"[a]gencies occasionally or
temporarily insufficiently staffed .... ",32 An agency which has no
staff of examiners, the argument runs, cannot be considered merely
''occasionally or temporarily insufficiently staffed." That such an
interpretation is possible under common usage is apparent from the
following statement: "The provision permitting agencies to borrow
examiners is intended to permit those who do not have full-time
examiners to borrow them as needed as well as to aid those agencies
borrowed examiner in tot, and singling out his "thorough report" for special praise, see NLRB
v. Southwire Co., 429 F.2d 1050, 1058 (5th Cir. 1970).
32. The current codification of section I I reads "an agency . . . which occasionally or




which may become temporarily or occasionally insufficiently
staffed. ' 3 But since that statement is contained in the legislative
history of section 11 itself, it demonstrates, paradoxically enough,
that its own use of the phrase "occasionally or temporarily
insufficiently staffed" was not the use intended by the APA. And
there is, of course, another acceptable meaning of the phrase. An
agency may be said to be "sufficiently staffed" with hearing
examiners when it has none at all, but also has no APA business for
which they are required; and when such an agency acquires an APA
case, it may be said to become "temporarily" insufficiently staffed.
As noted above, almost all of the section 11 loans authorized since
the enactment of the APA have been to agencies with no staffs of their
own. Even if the legislative history were ambivalent, then, there would
be strong reason to reject a narrow interpretation of the critical
phrase. Surely that reading should be preferred which leaves some
substantial function for section 11 to perform. But as a matter of fact,
the legislative history is far from ambivalent. In addition to the
sentence from the House committee report quoted in the preceding
paragraph, the Report of the Attorney General's Committee on
Administrative Procedure, wherein the loan provision originated,
clearly indicates that borrowings by "unstaffed" agencies were
envisioned.Y
PROCEDURE FOR LOAN
A section implementing the loan provision of the APA was
included in the Commission's proposals for its first permanent
Hearing Examiner Regulations.3 It read as follows:
§ 34.12 Utilization of examiners of other agencies. (a) At the request of
agencies occasionally or temporarily insufficiently staffed, the Commission
will arrange, if possible, for the temporary utilization by those agencies of the
services of hearing examiners of other agencies.
(b) Agencies, by agreement between themselves, may arrange for the
33. REPORT OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d
Sess. 47 (1946) (emphasis added), reprinted in A PA: Legislative History 28 1.
34. See the excerpt from the Report quoted in text following note 53 infra.
35. Because of "conflicting interests [which] could not be reconciled," Macy, The APA and
the Hearing Examiner: Products of a Viable Political Society, 27 FED. B.J. 351, 366 (1967), the
regulations were not ready in time to meet the June II, 1947, deadline established by section 12
of the APA for application of the examiner-selection provisions of section II. The permanent
regulations were therefore preceded by a temporary regulation adopted on May 29, 1947, which
permitted conditional reappointment, on June I1, 1947, of incumbents of hearing examiner
positions. 12 Fed. Reg. 3507 (1947).
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temporary utilization by one agency of a hearing examiner or hearing
examiners of another agency. Such agreements must have the prior approval of
the Commission before being put into effect.38
Doubtless because of the presence of many more controversial issues
in the proposed regulations (notably, the provisions for selection and
removal of examiners), section 34.12 drew little comment, both in the
public hearing held on July 9, 1947, and in written submissions to the
Commission. A representative of the Securities and Exchange
Commission urged that no Commission approval should be required
for a borrowing and that a mere report to the Commission should
suffice.3 7 At a meeting of the Commission and its Advisory
Committee on Hearing Examiners on July 18, 1947, one of the
members of the Committee cautioned the Commission that "the
proposed rule in fact departs from the express words of the statute
which, in such cases, requires the borrowed examiners to be 'selected
by the Commission' instead of the mere 'approval' of de facto
arrangements by agencies." ' 38 Despite this advice-and perhaps
because of agency opposition similar to that expressed at the public
hearing by the SEC representative, who felt that the proposal, far
from being too loose, was too strict-the proposed section 34.12
(renumbered as section 34.10) was adopted unchanged in the first
permanent regulations, issued on September 23, 1947.31
This original regulation governed the operation of the loan
program for almost fifteen years." During this period, loans were not
frequent 4 and were customarily arranged pursuant to the procedure
set forth in subsection (b), rather than subsection (a), of the
regulation. Typically, the agency desiring to borrow an examiner
would obtain from the Commission a list of six or seven suitable
candidates-that is, examiners with expertise in the field involved and
from agencies likely to spare their services. The borrowing agency
itself would then select one of the recommended examiners and
arrange with his agency for his loan. Finally, this arrangement would
36. 12 Fed. Reg. 4233 (1947).
37. Civil Serv. Comm'n Internal Memorandum (July 16, 1947). No stenographic report of
the hearing was made. See Statement by Carl McFarland Respecting the Proposed Hearing
Examiner Rules, July 18, 1947 (contained in Civil Serv. Comm'n files).
38. Statement by Carl McFarland, supra note 37.
39. 12 Fed. Reg. 6321, 6324; 5 C.F.R. § 34.10 (Supp. 1947).
40. It was not even amended when the Commission reissued all of Part 34 of its Regulations
in 1951, although it was then renumbered as section 34.13. See 16 Fed. Reg. 9623, 9626 (1951).
41. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
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be submitted for the Commission's approval which would, of course,
be granted.
The end of this simplified procedure, and of section 34.13 of the
regulations, can be traced to the case of Federal Home Loan Bank
Board v. Long Beach Federal Savings & Loan Association," which
concerned in part the validity of the appointment of one Robert H.
Hislop, an SEC hearing examiner who had been borrowed by the
Board. The relevant portion of the court's opinion bears quotation at
length, not only because of the legal point which it decides, but also
because of the light it sheds upon the actual functioning of former
section 34.13(b):
It is provided in section 11 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C.A. § 1010, that agencies occasionally or temporarily insufficiently
staffed "may utilize examiners selected by the [Civil Service] Commission
from and with the consent of other agencies." The Federal Home Loan Bank
Board does not have hearing examiners and was therefore required to utilize an
examiner selected by the Civil Service Commission.
Hislop's designation was arranged through the Civil Service Commission.
The general counsel of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board telephoned the
Commission regarding the procedure for obtaining a hearing examiner. Wilson
M. Matthews, administrative officer of the hearing examiner program,
suggested that the Board negotiate for the loan of an examiner from an agency
permanently staffed with hearing examiners. Matthews gave the general
counsel a list of names of hearing examiners experienced in financial matters.
Included were names of hearing examiners permanently employed by the
Securities and Exchange Commission.
The Board's general counsel then made inquiries of the SEC concerning its
hearing examiners. He was informed that one of the most capable examiners
permanently employed by the SEC was Hislop. The information was given that
Hislop was possessed of a judicial temperament and was especially qualified in
matters concerning accounting and finance. Neither the members of the Board
nor its general counsel had ever met Hislop.
The Board, acting through its chairman, wrote to the chairman of the SEC
requesting the loan of Hislop for service as a hearing examiner. The request was
granted. The Board then requested the Civil Service Commission to give its
approval, which was granted. The Board's general counsel testified before a
committee of Congress that he "selected" Hislop "because he was in the
Securities Exchange Commission, and I understood that he was an outstanding
examiner."
There is nothing in the record to indicate that Hislop was selected on the
basis of any inappropriate consideration as to his bent of mind or
predisposition, and appellants disclaim any charge of personal bias against
42. 295 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1961).
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him. Nevertheless, the facts recited above amply demonstrate that he was not
"selected" by the Civil Service Commission as required by the Administrative
Procedure Act. The very essence of that act was to divorce in so far as
possible the functions of prosecution and adjudication. The procedures
provided are designed to accomplish this more or less mechanically and to
avoid placing parties in the embarrassing and burdensome position of having
to charge or prove an inappropriate commingling of these functions.
If there is any doubt as to the legality of Hislop's appointment, we think the
doubt should be resolved in favor of the Association. Otherwise there must be
further proceedings occasioning further delay in these protracted
proceedings. . . . The possibility of an error can be prevented at this stage
without substantial loss of time since the administration proceeding has not yet
really gotten underway.
We therefore hold that Hislop was not validly appointed as hearing
examiner for this case.
4 3
The court in Long Beach was wise to make clear that its readiness to
invalidate the examiner's authority was attributable to the fact that
the proceedings were still in their preliminary stages. This dictum may
well have discouraged attempts to invalidate earlier decisions rendered
by examiners borrowed under section 34.13. In any event, no such
attempts were made.
On July 14, 1962, only eight months after the Long Beach
decision, the Commission amended section 34.1344 to what is
substantially its present form. Now numbered section 930.213, it
reads as follows:
At the request of an agency that is occasionally or temporarily
insufficiently staffed, the Commission shall provide for the temporary use by
the agency of the services of a hearing examiner of another agency. The
Commission, with the consent of the agency in which a hearing examiner is
employed, shall select the examiner to be used, and shall name the date on
which- the examiner is to be made available to the agency in need of his
services.4"
Under this new regulation, the following procedure for the making
of loans has been employed: The borrowing agency delivers a written
request to the Office of Hearing Examiners (often preceded by an
informal telephone request), expressing the need for an examiner,
stating the place at which and the approximate period during which
the hearing in question will be held, and describing the general nature
of the proceeding. The last-mentioned item of information is
43. Id. at 409-11 (footnotes omitted). The Board did not seek review of the court's decision
by certiorari.
44. 27 Fed. Reg. 6693, 6969 (1962).
45. 5 C.F.R. § 930.213 (1970).
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necessary for two purposes. First, it enables the Commission to
determine whether the proceeding is in fact an APA proceeding, the
only assignment for which the Commission has the duty or explicit
authority to arrange the loan. That determination is not always easy
to make, however," and the drastic result of an erroneous judgment
that section 11 does not apply is the invalidation of the proceeding
conducted without a hearing examiner or with a hearing examiner
selected by someone other than the Commission.17 The Office of
Hearing Examiners has therefore given great weight to the judgment
of the agency which requests the loan, and as far as can be ascertained
it has never declined to furnish an examiner where the requesting
agency has insisted that the contemplated proceeding was within the
APA. Not infrequently, however, the agency which has made a
request will agree, when the point is brought to its attention, that
section II is not applicable and that a hearing examiner may be
borrowed directly without the Commission's intervention.
The second reason for which the Office of Hearing Examiners
requests the borrowing agency to designate the general nature of the
contemplated proceeding is to enable the Commission to secure an
examiner with the expertise that may be necessary or desirable. A
genuine effort is made to match the man with the job. Since, for
example, the hearing examiner from the Small Business
Administration has considerable experience with cases involving
financial matters, he has often been selected for financially oriented
hearings before the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. When
the Federal Highway Administration proposed to hold hearings
concerning the reduction of certain bridge tolls, the Commission
selected an examiner from an agency which has experience in both
rate making and land transportation matters, the Interstate
Commerce Commission. And when the Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs needed an examiner for a rule-making proceeding
concerning the physiological effects of certain commercial drugs, the
Commission selected an examiner who, not because of his agency
experience but because of his previous background, was familiar with
46. See, e.g., Riss & Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 907 (1951) (per curiam), rev'g 96 F.
Supp. 452 (W.D. Mo. 1950); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
47. E.g., Federal Home Loan Bank Bd. v. Long Beach Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 295 F.2d
403 (9th Cir. 1961) (improperly-selected hearing examiner); Borg-Johnson Electronics, Inc. v.
Christenberry, 169 F. Supp. 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (non-hearing examiner).
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both the rudiments of chemistry and the nature of the pharmaceutical
business.
After receiving the request, as described above, the Office of
Hearing Examiners will sometimes decide upon a particular
individual peculiarly appropriate for the assignment, in which case it
will consult either him or his Chief Hearing Examiner, if his agency
has one, to be sure of his availability. More frequently, the Office
concludes that any one of the examiners from a particular agency
staff would be appropriate, and it then selects a specific individual in
consultation with the Chief Hearing Examiner concerned. The oral
consent of the loaning agency's personnel director is then obtained.
Since this is ordinarily a mere formality once the examiner or his
Chief has determined that he has time available, it is frequently
obtained by the examiner or his Chief rather than by the Office of
Hearing Examiners itself. The Office departs from the foregoing
procedure, however, when it seeks to borrow from a large examiner
staff which it knows to be busy and which it therefore rarely
approaches-for example, the Interstate Commerce Commission or
the National Labor Relations Board. In such cases, it usually directs
its initial request to the personnel director, who in turn discusses and
resolves the availability of examiners with his agency's Chief Hearing
Examiner and informs the Commission of the outcome.
When the identity of the loaned examiner has been determined, the
Commission advises the borrowing agency. This is often done initially
by telephone, but when the formal, written request of the borrowing
agency is received a written reply is dispatched, naming the examiner,
reciting that he has been selected by the Commission "with the
consent" of the loaning agency, setting forth the commencement date
and term of the loan, and stating that it will be "on a reimbursable
basis." A copy of this letter is sent to the personnel director of the
loaning agency.
At this point the function of the Commission in selecting the
examiner under section I1 of the APA has been completed, and
further details of the loan-such as arranging for reimbursement of
the loaning agency, advising the examiner of the precise time and
place of the hearing, and giving him copies of the pleadings, if
any-are handled directly between the borrowing agency and the
examiner or the examiner's agency. Copies of the Notices of
Personnel Action which actually commence and terminate the
examiner detail are sent to the Office of Hearing Examiners, but
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further action by the Office itself with respect to the loan will be
required only if the borrowing agency seeks an extension, in which
case formalities similar to those attending the original loan must be
observed.
The procedures described above not only meet the objections of
Long Beach, but go far beyond what that case requires. Long Beach
found fault with a procedure which gave so much dominance to the
borrowing agency that the Commission's role was reduced to that of a
rubber stamp. The new procedure not only eliminates the dominance,
but it precludes any borrowing-agency participation whatever in the
initial selection process. The Office of Hearing Examiners will not
accept loan requests which even suggest that a particular examiner be
considered for selection.
Curiously, this punctiliousness is not observed with respect to loan
extensions. Of course these pose no problem when their purpose is
merely to enable examiners to complete cases they have begun. Such
extensions -which comprise the only extensions sought by almost all
borrowing agencies-can in no way be regarded as attempts to
expand the consequences of examiner assignments which turned out to
be "lucky," but are rather efforts to enable the original objectives to
be achieved. An extension of this type is, one might say, within the
scope of the original gamble. One agency, however, regularly requests
the loan of an examiner not merely for a specific case, but for a
number of cases involving the same type of matter; and it often
requests an extension not only to permit the completion of pending
cases but also to enable the commencement of others.4" Surely in such
circumstances the request that a particular examiner be extended is no
different, insofar as the observance of proprieties under section 11 is
concerned, from the request that a particular examiner be appointed
for loan. If the latter is considered bad form, it is difficult to
understand why the former is not. The possibility always exists that
an agency will seek extensions for those examiners who are regularly
sympathetic to the agency's position, while allowing the loans of the
more obstreperous to expire without regret. Indeed, the likelihood of
the Commission's automatic compliance with a request that a
particular examiner be extended is much greater than the likelihood of
its automatic acceptance of the suggestion that a particular examiner
be selected in the first place.
48. This is the Office of the Secretary of the Department of HEW, charged with the conduct
of numerous "Title Vr" hearings. See text accompanying notes 56-59 and 98-99 infra.
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It would seem appropriate, therefore, that the Commission adopt
a policy of granting loan extensions only for the purpose of enabling
examiners to complete the cases on which they are engaged, and only
for the period of time necessary to accomplish that task. If an agency
has a continuing need for an examiner to conduct other business, a
request for loan, rather than a request for extension, should be
required. It is doubtless true that in most cases, for reasons of
administrative convenience, the Commission would respond by
extending the loan already outstanding; and that its power to appoint
an entirely new examiner despite the continuing availability of one
already on loan is as theoretical as the power which it possesses under
the present system to deny a request for extension despite continuing
availability. The proposed policy would, however, at least have this
important practical effect: When several loans are outstanding-as is
often the case at HEW, for example-the choice of which to extend
will rest entirely with the Commission, with no hint of the borrowing
agency's preference. Moreover, even if the proposal changes nothing
but form, this in itself is important when the public's confidence is at
stake. The Commission's extraordinarily strict practices with respect
to the original loan reflect this policy, and there is no reason why its
treatment of extensions should not do so as well.
Several problems have arisen in connection with the
reimbursement of agencies for the services of examiners whom they
loan. This matter is not specifically treated in either the APA or the
Commission's regulations pertaining to section 11. Full control of the
amount of reimbursement is, however, within the power of the lending
agency, since section 11 provides that it must consent to the loan.49 In
practice, this matter is handled quite informally. There is rarely any
negotiation between the lending and the borrowing agency; both
understand that the former will be reimbursed for the examiner's time
and travel expenses. The Commission's letter to the borrowing
agency, naming the examiner and approving the loan, typically states
simply that the loan will be "on a reimbursable basis," and that the
borrowing agency "will reimburse [the examiner] for any travel
expenses incurred in connection with the loan."
This procedure leaves several items uncertain. They are usually
resolved in a spirit of cooperation and good will by the two agencies
concerned, but on occasion, through bureaucratic inflexibility or
49. 5 U.S.C. § 3344 (Supp. V, 1970).
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otherwise, they have given rise to difficulty. First, there is the item of
secretarial expense. After holding the hearing, the examiner returns to
his own office to prepare his decision. This is often a lengthy process,
consuming not only the examiner's time but also the time of his
secretary in preparing the drafts which finally result in a document
that may be hundreds of pages long. Lending agencies have generally
billed the borrowing agencies for secretarial time as well as examiner
time, and those bills have almost always been paid. On at least two
occasions, however, they have not been. 0 Another difficulty arises
from the vagueness of the phrase "reimbursement for travel
expenses." Per diem allowances vary from agency to agency. Is the
examiner to be paid according to his own agency's rules or those of
the borrowing agency? On at least one occasion this problem has
given rise to examiner dissatisfaction.
The reasonable resolution of these problems seems clear enough.
Obviously the borrowing agency should pay for secretarial work
performed for its benefit. Even then it is receiving the free use of a
portion of the loaning agency's overhead. Just as obviously, the
examiner should not have to accept a per diem lower than that which
his own agency would accord; and he probably should receive the
borrowing agency's rate if that happens to be higher, on the
principle-if one is needed-that guests should be treated at least as
well as family. While the agencies themselves would probably reach
these conclusions if they negotiated the matter in advance, the
Commission's procedures preclude any inter-agency contact
concerning the particular loan until it has already been effected. Two
solutions are possible: The more complicated would be the conclusion
of an agreement among all agencies spelling out the details of
reimbursement for hearing examiner loans. The more simple would be
the inclusion of such details in a provision added to the section I 1
regulations of the Commission, to be applicable to all hearing
examiner loans unless otherwise specified in the loan request from the
borrowing agency or in the consent of the loaning agency. Although
the Commission has no power to dictate the terms of the loan, it
would surely be able to adopt such a provision in order to facilitate
the performance of its obligation to arrange the loan.
50. The difficulty in one of these instances arose simply because of the failure of the
borrowing agency's personnel office to obtain the necessary administrative approval in advance.
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SUCCESS OF THE LOAN PROVISION IN ACHIEVING ITS OBJECTIVES
The purposes of the loan provision are not discussed at any length
in the legislative history of the APA itself,51 but the Report of the
Attorney General's Committee, in which the loan provision
originated, contains an extensive explanation:
(b) Provisional and temporary appointments....
The appointment of temporary hearing commissioners may be necessitated
by different considerations. Sudden increases in the number of cases which
must be heard at a given time may be of only a temporary character, not
justifying the appointment of another hearing commissioner for a 7-year
term.5 2 Similarly, one or two unusually protracted proceedings may so reduce
available hearing personnel that dockets become congested with other cases. To
prevent the accumulation of backlogs, and to dispose of them as rapidly as
possible when they do occur, the Committee finds it desirable to permit
agencies, in such a situation, to appoint temporary hearing commissioners,
either by the temporary assignment of hearing commissioners from other
agencies or by the temporary appointment of persons who meet with the
approval of the Office of Federal Administrative Procedure. . ..
Furthermore, in some agencies, the volume of cases may be so small that
the appointment of a regular hearing commissioner may not be justified. The
Federal Reserve System has held less than a dozen formal adjudicatory
hearings since 1914; the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation has held only
22 hearings in three years; the War Department has set rates for a total of only
50 toll bridges, and often not a single rate hearing is held in the course of a year.
In agencies whose work load is as light as these, there are insufficient cases to
occupy a permanent hearing commissioner devoting his entire time to hearing
and deciding. The Committee, accordingly, does not recommend the addition
of regular hearing commissioners in such agencies. Instead, it is contemplated
that the agencies in which formal adjudication is a more or less inconspicuous
and inconsequential adjunct of other activities, will select temporary hearing
officers, as outlined above, to conduct and decide cases as they arise.
(d) Exchange of hearing commissioners.-While, as stated, each hearing
commissioner should be attached to a particular agency whose cases he is to
hear and decide, it should not be necessary that under all circumstances he
devote his entire energies to that agency. Rather, insofar as the several agencies
desire and request it, there should be permitted an interchange of hearing
51. The only discussion is contained in the brief excerpt from the Report of the House
Committee on the Judiciary quoted in the text accompanying note 33 supra. It amounts to little
more than a restatement of the statutory provision.
52. The Report of the Attorney General's Committee recommended that hearing examiners
be appointed for only seven year terms. ATr'Y GEN. REP. 46.
53. The Report of the Attorney General's Committee recommended the creation of an
Office of Federal Administrative Procedure, whose responsibilities would have included those
ultimately assigned to the Civil Service Commission under section I I of the APA. Id. at 46-49.
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commissioners among the agencies. Thus, for example, cases arising under the
Commodity Exchange Act probably will not justify the Department of
Agriculture's appointment of a full-time hearing commissioner, yet hearing
commissioners at the Securities and Exchange Commission should be well
qualified to hear Commodity Exchange Act cases. Similarly, the same hearing
commissioner might well be able to hear cases arising both under the National
Labor Relations Act and violation cases under the Walsh-Healey Act; or the
same commissioner may be qualified to hear misconduct cases coming both
before the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation and the Civil
Aeronautics Board. Interchange of this nature is desirable because it would
reduce the use of temporary hearing officers; it would save expense; it would
provide some variety for the hearing commissioner; and it would impart fresh
points of view to the agencies. . . ..
The loan program has generally fulfilled the Committee's
expectation that it would prevent the hiring of hearing examiners by
agencies with insufficient work to employ them full time. Subsequent
history of the three specific illustrations given in the Committee's
Report exemplifies this point. Neither the Federal Reserve Board nor
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation has ever appointed its own
APA examiner; both agencies have been recurrent borrowers since the
Act came into effect. The bridge-toll cases referred to in the
Committee's Report have been transferred from the jurisdiction of the
former War Department to the Federal Highway Administration, 5
but since that agency likewise has no hearing examiner of its own they
are regularly heard by a borrowed examiner.
The outstanding example of the manner in which the Office's
intelligent use of the loan provisions has avoided the needless creation
of hearing examiner positions in additional agencies is to be found in
the developments following enactment of Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.56 This prohibited discrimination in all federally assisted
programs and directed that each federal agency extending federal
financial assistance to any program enforce the prohibition. The
principal means of enforcement provided was "the termination of or
refusal to grant or to continue assistance under such program or
activity to any recipient as to whom there has been an express finding
54. Id. at 48-49.
55. The bridge-toll regulating 'functions of the Secretary of the Army, contained in 33
U.S.C. §§ 491-534 (1964), were transferred to the Secretary of Transportation by the act
which created that Department. 49 U.S.C. § 1655(g)(4) (Supp. V, 1970). The Secretary of
Transportation has in turn delegated them to the Federal Highway Administrator. 49 C.F.R.
§ 1.4(c)(10) (1970).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d(1964).
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on the record, after opportunity for hearing, of a failure to
comply. . . -57 Of course the underscored language brought the
proceeding under section 5 of the APA and, by virtue of section 7,
required it to be held before a section 11 hearing examiner. But the
vast majority of agencies administering federal assistance
programs -including the Department of Defense, the Office of the
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, the Department of
Housing and Urban Development, the Office of Economic
Opportunity, and the Social and Rehabilitation Service-did not have
any hearing examiners. As these agencies began to draw their
regulations for implementation of Title VI, the Office of Hearing
Examiners began to receive inquiries concerning the establishment of
new hearing examiner positions. It assured the agencies that, at least
until the volume of anticipated hearings could be more accurately
ascertained, it would be able to meet their needs through the loan
program, and persuaded all of them to forego the appointment of
their own examiners for the time being. The Office asked each of the
agencies with large examiner staffs to designate in advance examiners
who would be available to assist in the initial flood of Title VI work.
About half of the examiners so designated were given a two-week
course by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
concerning the substance, policies and procedures of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and applicable regulations. " These examiners later
conducted numerous Title VI hearings in various agencies and
enabled the Act to be fully implemented without the creation of a
single new hearing examiner position for that purpose.59
The loan program's utility in achieving an efficient use of highly
skilled manpower also has an inverse aspect not specifically
mentioned by the Attorney General's Committee. The program is,
57. Id. § 2000d-1 (1964) (emphasis added).
58. This initial group comprised approximately 25 examiners. A similar course was
originally planned for the other 25 examiners who had been designated for the "Title VI pool,"
but it was found that the first group was sufficient to handle all the hearings. Some litigants and
public officials objected to the Title VI course as an improper "indoctrination." Since, however,
the course was not conducted with reference to any specific case or fact situation, it appears
unobjectionable.
59. It is probably true, however, that the examiner staff of the Social Security
Administration has been increased beyond its normal needs in order to enable it to bear the
brunt of the Title VI loan business. The original "Title VI pool" is no longer functioning, and
the Title VI work is now almost invariably assigned to examiners from the Social Security
Administration, who have likewise been given special training for that purpose. See text
accompanying notes 97-99 infra.
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one might say, twice blest-it blesses him that gives, and him that
takes.6" Not only is it a boon, as the Attorney General's Committee
foresaw, to the agency in temporary need of an examiner; it also
benefits the agency which faces a temporary shortage of APA work
for its examiners to perform. To be sure, if the agency wishes to do so,
it may assign such examiners to other work not inconsistent with their
functions.6' But there is not often a great surplus of such work
requiring the abilities of a person with the hearing examiner's grade
level. The only economic alternative is a reduction in force. 2 Even
when this does not occur, if the other duties to which the examiner is
assigned require a lesser degree of ability, and if his remaining hearing
examiner duties do not include a substantial amount of work of that
level of difficulty which justifies his grade classification, the
Commission may be compelled to down-grade the position.63 In those
agencies with large examiner staffs, these severe consequences can
usually be avoided by distributing the non-APA work evenly among
all the examiners; but when an agency with merely one or two
examiners" is faced with a sudden drop in APA work, that solution is
not available. Moreover, it is not impossible for even an agency with a
large staff to be confronted with such a precipitous decline in the
60. Cf. W. Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice, Act IV, Scene I.
61. Such detail cannot be extended beyond 120 days in any 12-month period without the
Commission's consent. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
62. The security which section I I of the APA extends to hearing examiners' tenure does not
prevent a reduction in force. Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conf., 345 U.S. 128, 140-42
(1953). Under the Commission's regulations, however, any examiner who is affected by such a
reduction has a right to fill the next hearing examiner vacancy which appears at his own, or any
inferior, grade level in any agency-even despite his failure to meet the selective certification
requirements for the position. 35 C.F.R. § 930.215 (1970).
63. Apparently the Commission cannot, however, eliminate the hearing-examiner character
of the position, with all the special protections which that affords, so long as some portion of the
individual's duties involves the hearing of APA cases. The regulations define a "hearing
examiner position" as one "in which any portion of the duties includes those which require the
appointment of a hearing examiner under section 3105 of title 5, United States Code." 35
C.F.R. § 930.202(c) (1970). This, incidentally, is the reason the Office of Hearing Examiners
has insisted that all Chief Hearing Examiners, many of whom could profitably devote their
entire time to matters of administration and coordination, preside over at least one APA hearing
each year. In one respect, it is worse for an examiner to be down-graded than to fall victim to
reduction in force, since only in the latter situation do the regulations insure him appointment to
the next hearing-examiner vacancy at his old grade. See note 62 supra.
64. At present, the Civil Service Commission, the Small Business Administration, and the
Alcohol & Tobacco Tax Division of the Bureau of Internal Revenue have only one examiner.
The Food & Drug Administration, the Post Office, the Department of Labor and the Maritime
Administration have only two examiners.
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amount of its APA hearing business that the available work, even if
distributed evenly among the staff, would not be sufficient to justify
the maintenance of the same examiner force or to avoid a down-
grading. In 1951, for example, it was the separation of eight hearing
examiners from the National Labor Relations Board which gave rise
to the case of Ramspeck v. Feddral Trial Examiners Conference.65
Needless to say, aside from the foregoing considerations of economy
and the jeopardizing of employment tenure, lengthy periods of time in
idleness or in the performance of non-examiner functions are
destructive of examiner morale and professional pride. The loan
program has proved to be a solution to all of these
difficulties--indeed, as will be discussed in a later section, perhaps too
ready a solution.66 The agency facing a sudden decline in its APA
business need not make the choice between a reduction in force or
serious economic waste; it can be reimbursed for those portions of its
examiners' salaries attributable to loan work. The Commission need
make no reclassification of an examiner who continues to spend most
of his time in APA hearings, even though many of those hearings may
be before agencies other than his own. And the examiner himself not
only suffers no impairment of self-respect, but actually increases both
his abilities and his sense of professionalism through exposure to
novel and challenging situations.
Another of the benefits which the Attorney General's Committee
expected to result from the loan program-though doubtless a merely
secondary benefit-was that "it would provide some variety for the
hearing commissioner."1 7 This hope also has been fully realized. The
lists of borrowing and loaning agencies presented above give good
indication of the extent of interchange which has been achieved. There
is no question that the hearing examiners find this beneficial. In the
numerous interviews which were conducted in connection with the
present study, and which form the basis for the conclusions and
recommendations set forth in later sections of this article," the
hearing examiners without exception expressed enthusiasm for the
loan program, principally because of the variety which it provides.
The value of this variety should not be underestimated. Conceding the
65. 345 U.S. 128 (1953). See Macy, The APA and the Hearing Examiner: Products of a
Viable Political Society, 27 FED. B.J. 351, 373-74 (1967).
66. See pp. 358-59 of text infra.
67. Ar'y GEN. REP. 49.
68. See pp. 356-66 of text infra.
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worth of specialization, an examiner nevertheless reaches a point at
which he will function more efficiently in his specialized field if he is
given a change to hearings with a different factual and legal content.
The attentiveness and flexibility which an examiner must maintain are
stimulated by an occasional alteration of intellectual diet. The need
for such variation through the loan program doubtless is not equally
acute in all agencies. Examiners at the Federal Trade Commission,
for example, are exposed to more diverse matters in the course of their
regular duties than are examiners at the Federal Power Commission.
But it is believed that examiners in all agencies can profit from an
occasional shift to completely different subject-fields. Of course this
beneficial diversity could be provided by regularly assigning each
examiner to a different sort of intellectual task within his own
agency. 9 But in addition to being wasteful of the examiner's unique
talents, such a solution would fail to achieve another benefit which
arises from providing the variety through the loan program: the
heightening of professional pride. A loan brings home with special
force the point that the hearing examiner job is not an assembly-line
activity, but rather a function that requires, in addition to specialized
knowledge, the breadth, adaptability, and general competence of the
true professional. Those examiners who have been active in the loan
program claim to have acquired, and to have imparted to their
colleagues, an increased awareness of the importance of their duties,
the skill required to perform them properly, and the constant effort
and self-discipline necessary to avoid that intellectual stagnation
which is the major obstacle to every sort of professional excellence.
In another respect, however, the loan program has fallen far short
of the expectations of the Attorney General's Committee. It has in
general not been used, as the Committee had hoped, by those agencies
which have hearing examiner staffs of their own, to handle
intermittent overloads-or, in the Committee's language, "[t]o
prevent the accumulation of backlogs, and to dispose of them as
rapidly as possible . . . ."0 Borrowings by agencies with their own
staff have been extremely rare. 71 This phenomenon is explicable by the
69. This is permissible so long as the duties are not "inconsistent" with his duties as a
hearing examiner, and so long as the term of the detail does not exceed 120 days without the
Commission's consent. See text accompanying notes 19-23 supra.
70. ATr'y GEN. REP. 48.
71. This statement excludes the NLRB borrowings discussed above, which are not for the
agency's internal use. See text accompanying notes 25-31 supra.
[Vol. 1971:319
LOAN PROGRAM
need for hearing examiner specialization felt by those agencies which
have a regular enough hearing business to require their own staff. Or,
the opponents of selective certification 72 might say, it may be
explained by the reluctance of those agencies which employ selective
certification 73 to cast doubt upon the genuineness of their need for
specialization by making use of unspecialized borrowed examiners. 71
That some connection exists between the need for specialization-or
the need to appear to desire specialization-and the infrequency of
borrowing by staffed agencies is suggested by the fact that almost all
of those infrequent borrowings have involved examiners who were
formerly employed by the respective borrowing agencies, or who were
in process of, or under consideration for, transfer to those agencies. 75
Finally, as a direct result of the rarity of borrowing by staffed
agencies, it must be concluded that another hope of the Attorney
General's Committee for the loan program has not been substantially
realized. The Committee's expectation that the program would
72. Selective certification is the procedure whereby the Commission allows an agency which
so requests, and which justifies its request to the Commission's satisfaction, to select its hearing
examiners from a Selective Register which lists only those candidates who have specialized
experience in the field which that agency regulates. This usually enables the agency to select
candidates whose ranking on the General Register is too low to permit them to be selected under
the normal rules. See generally Hearings on Selective Certification Method of Appointing
Hearing Examiners Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1960) [hereinafter cited as Selective Certification Hearings]. From the
commencement of its use in 1953 to the present day, the selective certification procedure has
been the object of severe criticism from several quarters, including the Federal Trial Examiners
Conference and the American Bar Association. See, e.g., Miller, The Vice of Selective
Certification in the Appointment of Hearing Examiners, 20 AD. L. REv. 477 (1968).
73. Only about half of all agencies which have their own examiner staffs use selective
certification. This number includes, however, all the major regulatory agencies except the FTC
and all agencies with examiner staffs more numerous than 12 except the Social Security
Administration. Although the last mentioned agency has by far the largest examiner staff in the
federal government (approximately 300), it has been adding examiners with such regularity in
recent years that it has not found it necessary to borrow. Not including the Social Security
Administration, only about 50 of the remaining 320-odd examiners are in non-selective
certification agencies. Thus, a reluctance to borrow on the part of selective certification agencies
alone would have significant effect upon the frequency of borrowings by all staffed agencies in
general.
74. The generally successful operation of the loan program is sometimes cited as evidence
that selective certification is not necessary. See, e.g., Selective Certification Hearings 15-17. The
point would have more force if the very agencies which asserted a need for specialization-that
is, those employing selective certification-made regular use of borrowed examiners.
75. Under the loan procedures employed by the Commission prior to 1963, the borrowing
agency could select the examiner it desired. See text accompanying notes 35-43 supra. This
power was sometimes employed to obtain immediate use of an examiner whose transfer was still
in process or even to try out a particular examiner in order to determine his suitability for hiring.
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"impart fresh points of view to the agencies ' 76 surely referred
primarily to those interchanges concerning the procedures and
techniques of the hearing process which could be expected to occur
between the loaned examiner and the members of the examiner staff
to which he is temporarily assigned. When there is no such staff, there
is no such interchange. The contacts between a loaned examiner and
non-examiner members of the borrowing agency are of course
infrequent and superficial, except those formal contacts which occur
during the course of the hearing. Moreover, between officials whose
functions are so different, there is little common ground to discuss. It
may be added that the desired interchange of ideas among examiner
staffs has been pursued through means other than the loan
program-such as the Annual Seminar conducted by the Federal
Trial Examiners' Conference in conjunction with George Washington
University and the training sessions for hearing examiners conducted
by the Civil Service Commission several times each year at
Williamsburg, Virginia.
DISADVANTAGES OF THE HEARING EXAMINER LOAN
The principal benefits of the loan program have been alluded to
earlier. The system also has its disadvantages, a few of which might
perhaps be divined from an armchair, but some of which can only be
discerned by collecting and evaluating the judgments of a large and
representative number of persons who have been directly involved
with hearing examiner loans. The ensuing discussion is the result of an
attempt at just such a collection and evaluation. It is based upon
numerous interviews with agency heads, members of agency staffs,
chief hearing examiners, hearing examiners and private attorneys-all
from various fields of administrative law. Though the scheme of
interviews was intended to be representative rather than exhaustive, it
is believed to have included almost all examiners who have been
loaned with any frequency, all chief hearing examiners from agencies
which have loaned examiners with regularity, and one or more staff
members from all agencies which have borrowed with regularity. In
the following discussion, no attempt will be made to substantiate each
statement concerning experience under the loan program by the
citation of a particular interview; for except as otherwise indicated,
76. ATT'Y GEN. REP. 49.
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none of such statements is based upon an isolated opinion, but each is
rather the informed consensus.
Mistrust on the Part of Potential Borrowing Agencies
The first disadvantage from which the loan program suffers is that
it does not seem as good as it is. There is an inherent, and probably
irremediable, credibility gap. Hearing examiners, like judges or
professors, are not fungible; some are better than others. In point of
fact, those examiners who have participated most frequently in the
loan program are among the most respected. Those relatively few
agencies which have borrowed with regularity, and whose personnel in
charge of arranging loans have remained constant, are aware of this.
But among the uninitiate and the inexperienced, the conventional
wisdom is that a borrowed examiner will not be of the highest caliber.
One can hardly blame the agencies which harbor this groundless
suspicion, nor can one expect them to abandon it entirely, despite any
accumulation of evidence to the contrary. For as a matter of fact, the
suspicion is based upon a very accurate assessment of administrative,
not to say human, propensities: The agency which must loan an
examiner is obviously not going to loan its best man, but will rather
loan the man whom it can best do without. The only reason the
suspicion has not been substantiated by the facts in recent years is that
no agency has had to loan an examiner. Since several agencies have
had examiners in positive need of APA work, no arm-twisting or
inveiglement has been required to induce the grudging loan of a
member of an overburdened staff. To the contrary, in most cases the
loan has been as desirable for the lender as for the borrower. 77 If and
when this is no longer the case, there is no doubt whatever that, as the
Chief Hearing Examiner at one agency acknowledged, the loaned
examiner will not be one of the best men on the staff. But regardless of
whether that situation presently exists, no amount of persuasion or
demonstration is likely to eliminate the belief, at least in many
quarters, that a borrowed examiner is inferior in ability to one's very
own. The effect is to induce some agencies to create or increase their
77. See text accompanying notes 60-66 supra. The one recent exception to this proposition
may be some of those loans arranged for the purpose of establishing the "Title VI pool"
discussed in text accompanying notes 56-59 supra. Some of the members of that pool came from
regulatory agencies which had no surplus of examiner manpower. The early Title VI cases had
high political visibility, however, and strong pressure from the White House tended to assure not
only that the loans were made, but that the best personnel were provided.
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own examiner staffs much earlier than their volume of work really
requires.
The Borrowed Examiner's Lack of Special Knowledge
The second disadvantage inherent in the loan program relates not
to the actual or suspected raw ability of the borrowed examiner, but
to his acquired knowledge. It is not germane to the present study to
argue the merits of specialization. Its value is, after all, not absolute
and may be outweighed by other considerations, such as the increased
appearance of impartiality which use of a borrowed examiner can
lend to a hearing.78 It is the case, however, that specialization and the
bringing to bear of accumulated "expertise" are among the accepted
reasons for the very existence of administrative -as opposed to
judicial-rule making and adjudication. And whatever those reasons
are worth, their force is without doubt greatly reduced in hearings
conducted under the loan program. Except where the Office of
Hearing Examiners is able to obtain for loan an examiner who was
previously employed in the borrowing agency, or who has expert
knowledge in the subject field acquired in some other manner, the
borrowed examiner knows no more than the general practitioner
about the substantive and perhaps even the procedural rules he is to
apply.
Nor can the borrowed examiner's familiarity with the policies,
practices, and procedures of the agency be increased by a short "cram
course" conducted by the borrowing agency itself. Since his detail is
for the purpose of hearing one specific case, any such "briefing"
would be understandably objectionable to the private litigant, even if
conducted without explicit reference to the facts of the particular
case.79 For this reason, borrowing agencies limit their contact with the
examiner to advising him of the time, place, and subject matter of the
proceeding and furnishing him with copies of the applicable statute,
regulations, and rules of procedure.80 A vivid, if greatly atypical,
78. Several practitioners who were interviewed observed that, whether or not it was true,
they could not avoid feeling that their cases would receive a fairer hearing from examiners who
did not come from within the agency itself.
79. Although such a "briefing" by the Chief Hearing Examiner of the borrowing agency, as
opposed to its staff, would be less offensive, it still seems inappropriate since it would be done
with the particular case in mind. Moreover, as noted above, very few loans are made to agencies
which have their own examiner staffs.
80. An interesting exception to this general practice exists in that class of loans which has
been made to the United States Board of Parole for the purpose of holding hearings under
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illustration of what may happen as a result of the borrowing agency's
inability to give the examiner even a rudimentary orientation is
contained in the following account: The proceeding for which the
examiner had been borrowed was strictly pro forma-an entirely
unopposed application that the agency, in excessively strict adherence
to the letter of its statute, required to be disposed of "after a hearing
and on the basis of the record thereof." The agency staff had reviewed
all of the items with the applicant and found them satisfactory, and no
private interests had sought to appear in opposition. Counsel for the
applicant, being somewhat new to the field, asked the agency staff
what matters he should introduce at the hearing. The staff permitted
him to scan the records of earlier proceedings and made some specific
suggestions as well. In reply to the borrowed examiner's pre-hearing
request for disclosure of the general nature of the evidence, applicant's
counsel imprudently stated that he planned to introduce certain items
"at the suggestion of the agency staff." The examiner was profoundly
shocked and sent an irate letter to the responsible staff member,
censoring his improper "collusion." This particular incident was
doubtless not handled with the utmost finesse by any of the parties
concerned; but the opportunity for such a comedy of errors was
provided by the inevitable effect of the loan program, as currently
operated, in preventing even rudimentary education of the examiner in
the business of the agency.
Aside from such extraordinary incidents, however, it would be a
mistake to make too much of the extent to which the loan program
suffers from the lack of expertise on the part of borrowed examiners.
Almost by definition, those agencies which do not have their own
examiner staffs, and therefore must borrow, are not agencies which
hold hearings of the type in question with much frequency. Thus, there
section 504(a) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C.
§ 504(a) (1964). This provides, in relevant part, that no person convicted of certain crimes may
serve in certain capacities as an employee of a labor organization for a period of five years after
his conviction or imprisonment, unless the Board of Parole determines after an administrative
hearing that such employment would not be contrary to the purposes of the Act. It has been the
practice for a member of the staff of the Board of Parole to discuss with the borrowed examiner
the policies and purposes of the Act, the factors considered relevant by the Board to the exercise
of its discretion, and the procedures used in the conduct of the hearing. A crucial distinction
between these hearings and others, however, is that the Board has no function under the Act
except in connection with these hearings, and its function there is solely adjudicative. The
Application for a Certificate of Exemption is never opposed in the hearing by any member of the
Board's staff; this task falls to the Secretary of Labor, who has general responsibility for
enforcement of the Act.
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often does not exist a vast amount of "expertise" to be acquired. The
Federal Highway Administration, for example, has only held two
bridge-toll hearings in recent years, and it seems improbable that
anyone within the agency itself is steeped in knowledge on the subject.
Nor is the United States Board of Parole particularly teeming with
experts on the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959. In such situations the borrowed examiner's disadvantage is a
small one, and could be eliminated entirely if there were only an
opportunity for a brief orientation. To be sure, the hearings of some
agencies, although infrequent or rare, pertain to subject-matter which
is highly technical and is also the everyday business of the agency; in
these instances the borrowed examiner's newness to the field is
apparent, at least in the early stages of the hearing, and observers say
it has the effect of slowing the proceeding and expanding the record
somewhat. But the private practitioners consulted feel that even here
the borrowed examiner who is experienced in the process of
conducting a hearing is more satisfactory than a new examiner who
may be an expert in the agency's field but is a novice at presiding.
Finally,'it should also be recalled that the Office of Hearing
Examiners does make an effort to secure, wherever possible, an
examiner who has the required expertise-often through earlier
hearings conducted on loan to the same agency. In short, the
disadvantage of lack of expertise does exist under the loan program
and can never be entirely eliminated; but it is generally so small a
disadvantage as to be outweighed by the other benefits which the
program produces.
The Borrowed Examiner's Invisibility
Another disadvantage of the loan program, and one which is
considerably more serious, may be described by the word
"invisibility." The hearing examiner, even when he is not on loan, is
and properly should be one of the most independent of governmental
officials. His agency has power neither to reward him with
promotion8 ' nor to punish him with demotion or dismissal12 unless his
81. See 5 U.S.C. § 5362 (Supp. V, 1970). One small exception to this statement may exist.
The Attorney General has held, overruling the opinion of the General Counsel of the
Commission, that an agency has the power to select its own Chief Hearing Examiner-a
position which ordinarily carries a grade level one step higher than that for the examiner staff in
the particular agency. See 42 Op. ATT'Y GEN. No. 19 (1964). While it is at least questionable
whether the courts would sustain this position, the Commission has not chosen to contest the
point, and it is difficult to imagine a private litigant's raising it.
82. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 5362, 7521 (Supp. V, 1970). As noted in note 62 supra, an examiner
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misconduct is so grievous as to support formal APA removal
proceedings before the Civil Service Commission. s3 Moreover, even
the power to promote hearing examiners which was given to the Civil
Service Commission by section 11 of the APA14 has become a purely
theoretical one, since in recent years the Commission has
implemented a policy of establishing a single grade for all examiners
within each agency.85 The result is that-short of incompetence or
may be dismissed when there is a reduction in force; but this power cannot easily be directed
against a particular examiner, since "RIF" dismissals must, under the governing law, be
conducted strictly on the basis of seniority and veterans' preference. 5 C.F.R. § 930.215 (1970).
Of course, the agencies have at their disposal more subtle means of being nasty or nice to
their examiners. Hearing examiners in various agencies have at times complained that such
agency actions as the elimination of parking privileges or reduction in the amount of secretarial
assistance were unlawful as compromising the examiners' independence. Presumably to protect
themselves and the Republic from the possibility of such undue influence, in 1968 the Federal
Trial Examiners Conference adopted and recommended to the Commission a set of Standards
for Federal Hearing Examiner Office Space, Equipment, Supplies, Facilities, and Staff which go
into almost microscopic detail: "Bookcases (4), 5-sectional . . .Carpeting, wall-to-wall...
Staplers, hole punchers, and other standard office equipment, all new or modern and in working
condition . . . Agency stationery and envelopes imprinted with Hearing Examiner name and
title ...Legal size briefcase of adequate capacity, lockable, new . . .No Federal Hearing
Examiner shall at any time be required or requested to waive any of these standards." As far as
is known, however, there has never been any serious suggestion that the granting of amenities or
the imposition of inconveniences has been used to reward or punish particular examiners for the
character, the quality, or the quantity of their opinions. This particular issue of agency influence
through the granting or withholding of logistical support seems likely to be raised again by one
staff of examiners in the near future, since the Social Security Administration is considering a
plan which would not cut secretarial assistance across the board, but rather allocate it on the
superficially reasonable basis of the number of opinions which each examiner produces each
year (in that agency there is extraordinary variation).
83. See 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (Supp. V, 1970); 5 C.F.R. §§ 930.221-.234 (1970). Only four such
proceedings have been instituted- since enactment of the APA in 1946.
84. 5 U.S.C. § 5362 (Supp. V, 1970).
85. This policy was strongly advocated by the Hearing Examiner Committee of the ABA
Section on Administrative Law, by the Commission's own Advisory Committee, and by the
Federal Trial Examiners Conference. The only agency which now has examiners of varying
grade levels is the Office of the Secretary of Interior, where Indian Probate examiners are GS-13
and other examiners (who do mainly Bureau of Land Management work) are GS-15. This two-
grade staff was created very recently, as a result of the transfer to the Office of the Secretary of
the two separate staffs which formerly were lodged within the Bureau of Land Management and
the Bureau of Indian Affairs, respectively.
It is not meant to imply that abandonment of the old multi-grade system deprived the world
of an efficient and effective means of rewarding quality and quantity of examiner performance.
To the contrary, the very nature of the statutory framework rendered the device unworkable.
On the one hand, the Civil Service Laws require grade level to be determined by the level of
difficulty, level of responsibility, and qualification requirements of the work assigned. See 5
U.S.C. § 5106 (Supp. V, 1970). On the other hand, section 11 of the APA requires cases to be
assigned among hearing examiners "in rotation." 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (Supp. V. 1970). The
combination would appear to render the Commission's power to prescribe pay (5 U.S.C.
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neglect of such magnitude as to support removal proceed-
ings-hearing examiners are accountable to no one. Although some
disagreement may exist as to the wisdom of this arrangement, it is
little different from the complete independence accorded federal
judges. If non-accountability is an evil, perhaps it is a necessary one,
to assure judgments free from any taint of influence.
But despite the lack of formal accountability, it would be false to
imagine that hearing examiners, and judges, are free from any
inducement to excellence other than the strength of their own
character. First, both are subject to the approbation or contempt of
their professional colleagues. In most agencies examiners work in
close proximity to at least some other members of the examiner staff,
and in many cases the lawyers who practice before them are a small
and highly specialized bar. In the larger regulatory agencies, at least,
the examiners' opinions are published in a regular series of reports
which receives relatively wide circulation. Under such circumstances,
each examiner will inevitably create for himself a reputation on the
basis of the work which he produces; and a man of the professional
caliber to qualify for an examiner position may be expected to care
about this reputation, even if it does not mean money in his pocket or
the loss of his job. In addition, almost every agency with more than
ten examiners has a Chief Hearing Examiner who is personally
responsible for the quality and quantity of his staff's performance,
and who, unlike the agency staff, is not prohibited from discussing
such matters with the examiners.86 Although he possesses no power to
sanction, he can advise, persuade, cajole, and even shame the deficient
staff. As matters have developed he is, practically speaking, the only
formal, institutional control over the examiner's performance.
It will be immediately noted that each of these inducements to
maximum effort is greatly reduced, or nonexistent, in the case of an
examiner loan. The work of a borrowed examiner is performed,
§ 5362 (Supp, V, 1970)) illusory, except insofar as it may apply to elevation or reduction of the
grade level of an entire examiner staff. Although the Supreme Court managed a reconciliation of
the apparent inconsistency in Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conf., 345 U.S. 128, 13940
(1953)-holding that the rotation was to occur within each separate category of case
difficulty-that reconciliation was more logical than practical. The Commission ultimately
found the task of keeping each agency's hearing work divided into discrete categories of
complexity utterly unmanageable.
86. For a description of the duties of a Chief Hearing Examiner, see 42 Op. Avr'Y GEN. No.
19, at 4-6 (1964). These include "a major responsibility . . . for providing necessary
professional leadership, guidance, training and direction" to hearing examiners. Id. at 5.
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generally speaking, before a nonspecialized bar, and his opinion is
generally not published in any form which receives circulation beyond
the agency and the private litigants involved. In such circumstances,
the character of his work is not likely to win him a reputation; or, if
so, not one which will follow him back to the circle in which he spends
almost all of his professional career. Nor is there a Chief Hearing
Examiner to observe and comment upon his performance . 7
The Borrowed Examiner's Lack of Identification with the Borrowing
Agency
The final disadvantage of the loan system which bears mention is
the borrowed examiner's lack of identification with the interests of the
agency to which he is assigned. In point of fact this may, on balance,
be more of an advantage than a disadvantage. But that battle was
fought and decided many years ago, and the resolution was that it was
important where feasible for examiners to be part of the agency itself.
The method by which the hearing commissioners and their chiefs should be
selected presents a perplexing problem. Suggestion has been made that they be
a separate corps, not attached to specific agencies, and that they be appointed,
perhaps for life, perhaps for a specified term, by the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate. The [Attorney General's] Committee [on
Administrative Procedure] has given careful and searching consideration to
this and similar suggestions and has concluded that they are not desir-
able ...
[T]he hearing commissioner is in a very real sense acting for the head of the
agency. He is hearing cases because the heads cannot as a practical matter
themselves sit. He plays an essential part in the process of hearing and
deciding. .... "I
The purpose of [section II of the APA] is to render examiners independent
and secure in their tenure and compensation. The section thus takes a different
ground than the present situation, in which examiners are mere employees of an
agency, and other proposals for a completely separate "examiners' pool" from
which agencies might draw for hearing officers.89
87. Not infrequently, a loaned examiner will submit a copy of his opinion to the Chief
Hearing Examiner of his own agency, but this serves primarily the function of documenting the
examiner's expenditure of time away from his ordinary duties. It would be unrealistic to expect
the Chief Hearing Examiner to take time from his proper cares to supervise the quality and
quantity of work done on loan. Moreover, as noted above, the Chief's power rests entirely upon
the prestige and affection which he commands, and his persuasive ability-all of which are
diminished when he steps into fields not committed to his charge.
88. ATT'y GEN. REP. 47.
89. REPORT OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY ON S. 7, S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st
Sess. 29 (1945), reprinted in APA: Legislative History 215.
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The provision of section 11 that examiners shall be appointed "by and
for each agency"9 is the result, at least in part, of a feeling that those
who are "acting for the head of the agency" should have an
identification with the goals and policies of that agency. In some
examiner staffs, the reality and the benefit of that identification is
apparent; there is a noticeable esprit, a feeling of pride in, and
responsibility for, the achievements of the agency, and a
determination to maintain high standards in order to contribute to the
team effort.
In the loan provision of the APA, however, the value of
"identification" is sacrificed to other values such as economic
efficiency. The borrowed examiner has no special commitment to the
successful achievement of the goals of that agency to which he is
temporarily assigned. While the advantages of this judicial
detachment are apparent, it must also be recognized that there are
palpable disadvantages. It is peculiar, and probably significant, that
of the relatively small number of loan cases specifically discussed and
examined in connection with the present study-certainly no more
than thirty-no less than three contained criticism, intentional
disregard, or invalidation of the borrowing agency's governing
statute, its policies, or its regulations. In one, the governing statute
was enforced with the opinion that it was probably unconstitutional; 9
in a second, a clear line of agency decisions was deliberately ignored
as being contrary to the governing statute;9" and in a third, the
agency's regulations were held to be ultra vires.13 No attempt was
made to examine all, or even an intentionally representative sampling,
of the opinions of loaned examiners. But even on a haphazard basis,
encountering such a high proportion of decisions against the
agency-on the basic law rather than the facts-gives one cause to
wonder. The point is not that the borrowed examiners in these cases
were wrong; substantively, they may well have been correct, even
90. Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, § I1, 60 Stat. 244. The corresponding provision of the
current law reads "each agency shall appoint . . . hearings [sic] examiners." 5 U.S.C. § 3105
(Supp. V, 1970).
91. In re Drouin, Application No. L-23 (U.S. Bd. of Parole 1967) (hearing examiner
recommended decision).
92. In re United Virginia Bankshares, Inc., 56 Fed. Res. Bull. 602 (No. BHC-98) (hearing
examiner recommended decision), recommendation rejected, 56 Fed. Res. Bull. 599 (Fed. Res.
Bd. 1970).
93. In re Calhoun County (S.C.) School Dist. No. 1, No. CR-206 (Off. of Ed., H.E.W.,
1967) (hearing examiner recommended decision holding Guidelines issued under Title VI ultra
vires). The recommendation was rejected by the Office of Education (unpublished),
[Vol, 1971:319
LOAN PROGRAM
despite the subsequent agency reversals. But the frequency of
decisions of this type among the admittedly small sampling confirms
the impression which this writer received from the numerous
interviews conducted: The borrowed examiner approaches his case
with an attitude significantly different from that of an examiner
sitting within his own agency-an attitude closer to that of an
appellate court than of one who is "acting for the head of the
agency." For better or worse, his decision is somewhat less of an
"'agency decision," with the cohesiveness of purpose which that
phrase implies; and somewhat more of an objective judicial
determination, giving the agency the benefit of no legal doubts,
inserted at the very outset of the administrative process.
Even if one adopts the position, contrary to the view taken by the
APA, that absence of identification with the deciding agency is
generally desirable, it must also be borne in mind that in the case of a
borrowed examiner this is combined with a presence of identification
with another agency. The combination seems surely undesirable, since
it assures the loan business a position of secondary importance.
It is of course impossible to measure with any precision the extent
to which "invisibility" and "lack of identification" have actually
impaired examiner performance on loans. Borrowing agencies and the
litigants which appear before them have little basis upon which to
make a comparison. Though they may complain, for example, about
the length of time which a borrowed examiner takes to render his
decision, this complaint is not unheard of in those agencies with their
own examiner staffs. And the mediocrity which a particular examiner
displays on loan may be no different from the quality of his
performance within his own agency. Nevertheless, even making
allowances for such imponderables, the interviews conducted in
connection with this study indicated that "invisibility" and "lack of
identification" have had their adverse effect. For example, according
to the account of a staff member of one borrowing agency, in one
instance, after more than three months had elapsed since completion
of the hearing, the agency's attempts to ascertain when the opinion
could be expected were finally rewarded by a letter from the examiner,
returning various materials pertinent to the case, "inasmuch as he
understood his opinion was no longer required." 4 It appears that
94. Taking the broad hint, the agency decided the case on the record, without benefit of a
recommended decision. Lest the reputation of the current examiner corps be impugned, it should
be noted that the examiner in question has since retired.
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shortly after the hearing in the case, the examiner had transferred his
permanent position to a new agency which was busy and made heavy
demands upon his time. "Invisibility" and "lack of identification"
made it inevitable that the borrowed work would be given short
shrift-though it is unusual and regrettable that it should have passed
on entirely unshriven.
THE NEED FOR RESTRUCTURING AND A PROPOSAL
Except for that initial failure to exercise the power of selection
which resulted in the Long Beach case, 5 the Commission's
administration of the loan program seems to have been successful.
While the program might be more tightly structured and formalized
to give a greater appearance of efficiency, it is really doubtful whether
such measures would help, rather than hinder, the attainment of the
principal goals. It is initially tempting to suggest, for example, that
the Office of Hearing Examiners require monthly reports concerning
the workload of the hearing-examiner staffs in the various agencies,
thereby enabling it to tell at a glance the availability of examiners for
loan work. But in fact, through its regular contacts with the
examiners and their Chiefs, the Office knows quite well which staffs
are generally busy and which are not. Moreover, the hearing business
of the various agencies fluctuates so rapidly from week to week that a
workload report would be unreliable almost as soon as it was
submitted. This matter, like many others, is better handled by a few
phone calls than by reference to a written report. Informality and
flexibility of procedure, with the resultingly large scope afforded to
the discretion of the Office of Hearing Examiners, is one of the great
strengths of the loan program; it should be retained.
There is, however, one major improvement which the Commission
should consider. It would be misleading to call it merely a change in
the administration of the program, since it would in fact alter the
basic structure to a form probably not envisioned by the draftsmen of
the APA. Yet the basic purpose of this alteration would in a sense be
stability rather than change; modification of structure is necessary in
order that, under newly developed conditions, the essential operation
and effect of the loan program may remain the same as originally
intended.
The newly developed conditions are traceable ultimately to
95. See text accompanying notes 35-43 supra.
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enormous increase in the demand for examiner loans. As noted above,
this demand has recently reached the level of almost 100 per year, as
compared with only 9 loans during the entire period from June of
1947 to January of 1954. The increase is the result of a number of
factors which are more likely to intensify than to disappear in the
foreseeable future-including expansion, both by legislative and by
judicial decree, of the categories of hearings which must be conducted
under the APA; constant growth in the number of separate
"agencies," as that term is defined in the APA; 8 and a rise in the
sheer volume of federal administrative activity. Of course the number
of examiners available for borrowings has increased as well-from
approximately 100 in 1947 to approximately 600 at the present time.
But in addition to the fact that this rate of increase does not match
that in the number of borrowings, it must be borne in mind that one
of the efficiencies of scale is maximum continuing use of personnel.
An agency with only three examiners may well encounter periods
during which one of them has some time to spare; but an agency with
enough business to occupy thirty examiners will find that the
occasional decrease in one aspect of its operations is likely to be
counterbalanced by an increase in some other aspect, so that it can
rarely be expected to have ten examiners with time to spare.
Moreover, approximately 60 percent of the increase in the examiner
corps since 1947-that is, approximately 300 members of the current
corps-is accounted for by the Social Security Administration, whose
examiners are generally unaccustomed to formal, adversary
proceedings of the complexity which may be involved in most loans
97
and are less accessible for ready borrowing by other agencies because
they are scattered in large and small cities throughout the country.
Thus, except for the numerous Title VI hearings conducted by their
parent Department of Health, Education and Welfare, and for which
they have been specially trained,9" Social Security examiners are
almost never detailed on loan.
From this fact that the demand has outstripped the readily
available supply, two results have quite naturally flowed. First, some
agencies confronted with a grave but temporary need for examiners
96. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (Supp. V, 1970).
97. Because the Commission has found their work to be less difficult, Social Security
examiners are alloted a grade level of GS-15, as compared with GS-16 for all of the major
regulatory agencies.
98. See text accompanying notes 56-59 supra.
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have taken steps to insure that borrowed examiners would be
available. This has been possible in the case of the constituent
agencies of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, whose
central administration has evidently caused one of its constituent
agencies, the Social Security Administration, not only never to refuse
a loan to another constituent agency for the purpose of holding a Title
VI hearing, but even to devote its examiners' time to training for that
very purpose. Thus, although the Social Security Administration has
expressed a constant need to increase its examiner staff,9 it found
itself able to contribute 49 of the 86 examiner loans made in Fiscal
1970-all for Title VI work, and all except one to other agencies
within the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. It is
difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Social Security
Administration is hiring and retaining some examiner manpower for
the very purpose of doing loan work.
The second predictable result of the constant excess of demand
over supply has been that some agencies have come to rely upon the
demand to provide their examiners with APA work. Of the 37 loans in
1970 not supplied by the Social Security Administration, 17 were
supplied from the 11 -man staff of the Federal Trade Commission, 4
from the one-man staff of the Small Business Administration, and 4
from the one-man staff of the Civil Service Commission. These
figures are not extraordinary but follow a pattern which has emerged
in recent years. Those three agencies have accounted for a vastly
disproportionate amount of the loan work; correspondingly, a
disproportionate amount of all the APA work done by the staffs in
those three agencies is work done on loan. It thus appears that the
loan business has come to be relied upon both as a means of
reimbursement for examiner time which the agency itself cannot use
to full effect and also as a means of keeping examiners relatively busy
and contented with appropriately challenging work.
It is not suggested that these developments are improper or that
they have necessarily been bad in their net effect. To the contrary, it
would appear that they alone have enabled the loan program to meet
the manpower needs of the agencies. On the other hand, it may well be
questioned whether these means are most efficient and most consistent
with the purposes of the loan program, and whether they can be relied
99. The Social Security Administration sought to add 39 new examiners to its staff in 1969
and another 50 in 1970. In neither year was it able to till all the positions.
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upon to endure. The induced hiring or retention of examiners for the
very purpose of going on loan has effectively met the need of the Title
VI cases solely by reason of the happy circumstance that the agencies
which felt the need happened to be part of a department which had
power over one agency with a large examiner staff. In the next
emergency, that circumstance may not exist. Moreover, it is neither
efficient nor in accord with the intent of the loan provision of the APA
for an agency charged with the execution of its own substantive
functions to intentionally overhire or, alternatively, intentionally
divert examiner manpower which it needs itself. The second expedient
which has saved the loan program in recent years-the repeated use of
examiners who were not intentionally hired for loan work but who
have really become superfluous as far as the work of their own
agencies is concerned-is even more obviously inefficient and
contrary to the intent of the Act. Surely the morale and
professionalism of any examiner will suffer from the awareness that
he has become something of a spare part within his own agency,
however useful he may in fact be to the administrative system as a
whole. It is one of the virtues of the loan program that it can prevent
the unhappy consequence of a reduction in force when there occurs a
sudden and temporary decline in the business of a particular agency.
But like all virtues, this one can be carried to a vice, and that has
occurred when the loan program enables and assists the maintenance
of staffs which are permanently excessive. Indeed, when it has this
effect it is achieving the precise opposite of its intended purpose, which
was to forestall the hiring of "part-time" examiners, not to facilitate
their retention. And if the "intentional overhiring" expedient cannot
be relied upon to recur, the "accidental permanent availability"
expedient can be relied upon neither to recur nor to continue. The
sudden and drastic decline in the workload of the Federal Trade
Commission was surprising; repetition of the phenomenon in another
agency with a large examiner staff would be miraculous. And the
FTC itself, while not cutting back its staff as long as there is loan
work for them to do, is allowing the staff to deplete through the
normal attrition of transfer and retirement."'
In summary, the undoubted success of the above-discussed
expedients in enabling the loan program to meet its primary goal
100. The size of the FTC examiner staff has dwindled from a peak of 24 to its current
number of only II.
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should not obscure these critical facts: that the existing practices are
an alteration of the original conception of the loan program; that
some such alteration seems necessary if the program is to accomplish
its vastly expanded mission; and that the chosen or serendipitously
developed alteration is impermanent and in several respects
contradictory to the purpose of the APA. These facts suggest the need
for consideration of a plan to staff the loan program in the future.
Evidently, the only means of assuring an adequate supply of
examiners for loan work is to employ examinersfor that very purpose.
This might be achieved by persuading a number of agencies to remain
permanently overstaffed, and it might be done in such a manner that
no single agency would be so seriously overstaffed as to affect
examiner morale. But it would be administratively much more
efficient, and would in addition serve other desirable ends, to create
within a single agency a small corps of "examiners-at-large," charged
with the primary responsibility of servicing those agencies without
their own examiner staffs. This corps would have its own Chief
Hearing Examiner whose specific function would be to see that his
staff meets the needs of other agencies in a prompt and efficient
manner. It is of course desirable that the agency within which this
corps is established be essentially a "service" agency-that is, not one
which has a separate mission of its own that might cause its
supervision of the loan corps to be given second priority, but rather
one whose entire function is to provide for the needs of other agencies.
The Administrative Conference meets this qualification, but its
structure and outlook are directed toward research and
recommendation rather than the active administration which
supervision of the loan corps would require. The more obvious choice
is the Civil Service Commission, a "service" agency which is
specifically concerned with personnel administration. Great
advantages of efficiency, moreover, exist in having the corps located
within the very agency which must, under the APA, select the
examiner for loan. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine the system
operating otherwise. It is true that prior to adoption of the APA and
since, some have contended that the Commission is not by its nature
qualified to supervise quasi-judicial personnel-or, for that matter,
legal personnel in general. 01 But unless the APA's rejection of this
101. The Attorney General's Committee had proposed the creation of an Office of Federal
Administrative Procedure which, among its other functions, would have exercised that
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position is reconsidered, it would seem almost essential that any loan
corps of the sort here discussed be based in the Commission.
The primary impetus for suggesting consideration of a loan corps
is its imminent indispensability to the mere continuation of the loan
program. But in addition to assuring the program's survival, it seems
likely to improve its quality as well. Many of the disadvantages of the
loan program discussed in the preceding section could be eliminated
or substantially reduced. There would be less reason to mistrust the
quality of the borrowed examiner, since the question which the
lending agency will ask itself in order to determine his availability is
not "Whom can we spare from our own proper work?" but rather
"Who is the best member of our staff for this particular job which is
our own proper work?" What has been called the borrowed
examiner's "invisibility" would also be reduced, since the reputation
which he establishes in his own agency and among his own associates
will be based entirely upon the quality and efficiency of his
performance on loan. It is probably too much to expect that the
borrowed examiner's "lack of identification" with the borrowing
agency will be eliminated, although some improvement may be
expected from the fact that the same examiners will be returning to the
same agencies with greater frequency under the proposed system. Yet
even if the borrowed examiners do not develop a personal
commitment to the work of the agency to which they are loaned, at
least they will not suffer from a commitment to the work of some
other agency which may cause them to give their loan work second
place. Moreover, a Chief Hearing Examiner would have the positive
responsibility of seeing that the loan work is done promptly and well.
Finally, and most important, the proposed system would enable the
borrowed examiners to become educated in the substance and
procedures with which they will have to deal. The entire loan corps
could be exposed to brief courses on the work of those agencies which
supervision of hearing examiners ultimately given to the Commission by the APA. See ATT'Y
GEN. REP. 46-50. That proposal, as well as one which would have placed supervision of
examiners in an Office of Administrative Justice whose Director would be appointed by the
Judicial Conference of the United States, were considered and rejected in the deliberations which
resulted in the APA. See S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 41-42 (1946), reprinted in APA:
Legislative History 371. Since the adoption of the APA, the American Bar Association, or at
least the Hearing Examiners Committee of its Section of Administrative Law, has maintained
as its "official position. . . that the hearing examiner program be taken from the Commission
and lodged in an independent office of administrative procedure." 4 ABA AD. LAW SECTION,
ANNUAL REP. OF ComMMs. 21 (1967) (Hearing Examiners Comm. 1966-67).
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are regular borrowers. So long as such courses are not given when
particular litigation is in process or in contemplation, they should not
be objectionable even if conducted by the borrowing agencies
themselves. Although some might oppose an agency's giving such an
"indoctrination" course to its own examiners, the complete
separation of the loan corps from the borrowing agency, and the
consequent absence of any possibility of undue influence, ought to
make such a procedure generally acceptable.
The proposed loan corps will also be of value as an experiment.
The suggestion is often heard that all examiners should operate from a
common "pool" instead of being employed by the agencies whose
disputes come before them.0 2 The loan corps would be a modest step
in this direction and would yield some concrete information, which
does not now exist, as to the feasibility of the "pool." Even if the use
of a "pool" is not desirable for all agencies, it may be that the success
of the loan corps would induce some agencies which now have small
examiner staffs to eliminate them and to rely upon an increased loan
corps instead. The possibilities are intriguing, and it is an experiment
which can be conducted without coercion of unwilling agencies and
without disruption of current procedures in agencies with their own
examiner staffs.
If it is administered with foresight and imagination, the loan corps
need not reduce the economic efficiency of the present system, nor
deprive ordinary examiners of the professional benefits which they
now derive from their loan work. The size of the corps should be held
at that level which is necessary to attend to the loan business that
cannot be handled in the spare time of those examiners in other
agencies who are generally busy with their own work. Thereby,
examiner manpower will be utilized to its fullest, and the desirable
opportunity for diversification of experience will not be reduced. The
loan corps examiners would be assigned insofar as possible to those
cases arising within agencies that are regular borrowers, thereby
maximizing the benefit of the educational courses suggested above,
and enabling the development of a certain expertise. It might
eventually be possible even to increase the opportunity for
diversification and to provide a currently nonexistent opportunity for
day-to-day professional contact among examiners in different
102. Such a suggestion was made by a number of the hearing examiners interviewed. It is by
no means a new one, having been considered and rejected by the draftsmen of the APA. See S.
REp. No. 752,79th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1945), reprinted in APA: Legislative History 215,
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agencies by establishing a sort of sabbatical program under which
examiners, might be assigned from their own agencies to the loan
corps for one-year terms. If the loan corps is successful enough to
induce some agencies to eliminate their own small staffs, it might well
grow to a size which would make such a sabbatical arrangement
feasible.
Once it is determined that the loan corps will handle only the
"overload" of loan work, prospects for its efficient operation and
hopes for its gradual increase in size depend upon nonrecurrence of
that permanent overstaffing in other agencies which has been
discussed above. This can be prevented, or at least discouraged, and
its harmful effect upon the loan corps can be eliminated by the
establishment of a Commission policy refusing consent-as it has
never heretofore done-to the loan of any examiner other than those
in the loan corps beyond a specified number of days per year, and
refusing consent to cumulative loans by any single agency other than
itself beyond a specified number of man-days per year (varying, of
course, with the size of the agency's examiner staff). Viewed properly,
such a policy would not create inefficiency but would eliminate the
subsidization of inefficiency which now exists-a subsidization which
is also undesirable because of its effect upon examiner morale. Those
examiners who are affected by a reduction in force as a result of this
policy could be added to the loan corps if the caseload warranted; in
any event, the number of examiners in all agencies has now reached
such a level, and turnover by reason of retirement will soon attain
such a regular rate, that transfer of the "riffed" examiner to another
agency will be easily arranged. Failing this, his wait for the next
available examiner job at his level, to which he is entitled,°10 will surely
not be long.
The optimum time schedule for the adoption of the loan-corps
program depends upon whether it is decided to wait for the withering
away of the current examiner surplus at FTC and the Small Business
Administration or rather to take affirmative steps for its elimination.
The latter course is not only feasible but is administratively more
convenient, since it would enable the loan corps to begin with
seasoned examiners. The examiner at the Small Business
Administration and those FTC examiners not needed for disposition
of that agency's own business could be transferred to the Commission
103. See note 62 supra.
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and, together with the Commission's present examiner, would
comprise the initial loan corps. This action would of course have to be
taken in consultation with the agencies involved, but iW'seems likely
that they would agree. If any added incentive to their cooperation
were needed, the Commission could put into effect at once the
limitations on frequency of examiner loans suggested above, making
the retention of examiners not needed for dispatch of the agencies'
own business more costly.
One technical objection to the loan-corps concept merits
discussion. The APA required that examiners be appointed "by and
for each agency." 104 Although the 1966 recodification of Title 5
eliminated that specific phraseology, 05 the alteration was specified to
be "without substantive change."'06 Since the word "by" in the
original provision already provides an adequate indication that the
examiners are to be employees of the agency, it might be thought that
the word "for" must fairly be understood as requiring an examiner's
appointment to be for the primary purpose of handling the agency's
own work, although loans may be permitted once this purpose has
been adequately met. On the basis of such an interpretation, it could
be argued that the Commission would act improperly in hiring
examiners explicitly to do the work of other agencies. This argument
might be met by the hair-splitting defense that the Commission's
assigned task is, generally speaking, to meet the manpower needs of
other agencies, and that, more specifically, section I I itself makes it
the Commission's business to provide manpower for examiner loans.
Ultimately, then, the hiring would be "for" the Commission, even in
the sense of being for the purpose of handling its own work. But a
more basic and honest reply to the argument is that its interpretation
of section 11 attributes to the pertinent language a precision and
stringency which was not intended. Nothing in the legislative history
of the APA indicates any fear that some agencies might choose to use
their examiners to do the work of other agencies, or any desire to
guard against such improbable munificence. The Bill originally
introduced by Senator McCarran' 7 and the Senate Judiciary
104. Act of June I1, 1946, ch. 324, § 11,60 Stat. 244 (quoted in the text accompanying note
4 supra).
105. The corresponding text now reads "[elach agency shall appoint." 5 U.S.C. § 3105
(Supp. V, 1970).
106. Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, § 7(a), 80 Stat. 63 1.
107. S. 7, 79th Cong., Ist Sess. (1945).
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Committee Prints of May and June, 1945, which suggested certain
amendments to that Bill, provided only that examiners would be
appointed "for each agency."' 08 This language was important and
controversial, for it embodied a rejection of those proposals, some of
which were contained in House Bills;'"' which would have removed the
examiners from the agencies entirely and assigned them to one form
or other of "examiner pool." It represented a determination that each
agency should have its own examiners-not that no agency should be
able to hire examiners for the purpose of assisting in some other
agency's work.
The origin of the "by" portion of the clause appears in the
following excerpt from the Senate Judiciary Committee Reprint:
It is urged that the Civil Service System be utilized, as provided [in the
proposed text set forth above], with or without certain modifications. The first
of these modifications is that examiners be appointed "by each agency" rather
than "for each agency. .. .
This proposal also raised a controversial point. The mere fact that
examiners were to be appointed "for" specific agencies did not
necessarily require that they be appointed "by" those agencies. The
original Senate Bill was not explicit on the point, although since the
appointments were to be made "subject to the civil-service . . . laws"
they would presumably have been made by the agencies. The lack of
precision on the point apparently caused some misgivings, in light of
the fact that four of the House Bills under consideration specifically
provided for appointment by someone other than the agencies
themselves."' Evidently, at the time of the Committee Print those
within the Senate Judiciary Committee who shared these misgivings
believed that the word "by" would clarify that point, as well as
convey the meaning borne in the original version by the word "for."
And presumably the "for" advocates believed that the identity of the
appointing body was clear enough and that what needed supreme
emphasis was the fact that the examiners were to be employed within
108. See A PA: Legislative History 41 (discussing the Committee Prints).
109. H.R. 339 and H.R. 1117, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945), reprinted in APA: Legislative
History 139, 147.
110. APA: Legislative History 42.
11I. H.R. 184 and H.R. 1206 provided that the examiner be nominated by the agency in
which he would serve but be appointed by an Office of Federal Administrative Procedure if it
found him qualified. Id. at 134, 171. H.R. 339 and H.R. 1117 provided for the appointment of
hearing officers by three Commissioners to be named by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate. Id. at 142, 151.
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the agencies themselves. The final result-predictable enough-was
the use of both words, a triumph of caution and compromise. In light
of this history, neither the use of both words separately nor their use in
combination should be understood to contain any prohibition of the
proposal made above.
